Rico v. United States

Summary

Writing for an 8-1 majority, Justice Gorsuch reversed the Ninth Circuit's rule that a federal defendant who absconds from supervised release automatically extends that term until authorities catch up. Isabel Rico's original 42-month supervised release term was ordered to expire in June 2021. She absconded in 2018, and during her years on the run committed state crimes including a January 2022 drug offense. The district court (applying the Ninth Circuit's tolling rule) treated that 2022 offense as an independent supervised-release violation and sentenced her accordingly. The Supreme Court held the Sentencing Reform Act supplies no such extension rule. The Act specifies when supervised release starts and ends, provides a true tolling rule only for 30+ day imprisonment on a separate offense (§3624(e)), permits post-expiration revocation only when a warrant or summons issued during the term (§3583(i)), and otherwise requires a hearing to extend supervision (§3583(e)(2)). Against that detailed scheme, the Court read Congress's silence on automatic extension as intentional. Justice Alito dissented, arguing the whole debate was beside the point: the judge could have considered the 2022 drug offense under § 3553(a) in fashioning a within-Guidelines sentence regardless of the tolling question.

Structured facts

Parties

Petitioner/Appellant: Isabel Rico
Respondent/Appellee: United States

Jurisdiction

federal — U.S. Supreme Court on certiorari from the Ninth Circuit

Statutes cited

18 U.S.C. § 3583(b) (maximum supervised release terms), 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (mandatory conditions), 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) (extensions of supervised release), 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (revocation and reimprisonment), 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) (additional term after imprisonment), 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i) (post-expiration adjudication), 18 U.S.C. § 3601, § 3603, § 3624(e) (probation/supervision framework), 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (sentencing factors)

Issue

Whether the Sentencing Reform Act authorizes courts to treat abscondment as automatically extending ('tolling') a term of supervised release beyond the date ordered by the sentencing judge.

Holding

No. The Act's detailed extension, tolling, and post-expiration provisions foreclose an automatic-extension rule for abscondment.

Outcome

reversed and remanded

Vote

8-1

Majority author

Gorsuch (joined by Roberts, Thomas, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, Jackson); Alito dissenting

Key facts

• Rico was serving a 42-month supervised release term scheduled to expire in June 2021.
• She changed residence without notifying her probation officer in 2018; a warrant issued in May 2018 but she evaded capture until January 2023.
• During abscondment she committed state crimes including a January 2022 drug offense.
• The district court treated the 2022 drug offense as a Grade A supervised-release violation and sentenced her to 16 months plus a new 2-year term of supervised release.
• The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that abscondment 'tolled' supervised release so her term was still running at the time of the 2022 offense.

Reasoning

Gorsuch reframed the Ninth Circuit's 'tolling' as really extending the term because absconders remain bound by conditions and punishable for violations. The Act sets fixed start and end dates for supervised release, caps maximums, and where Congress wanted extension or tolling it said so expressly (§§ 3583(e)(2), 3583(i), 3624(e)). The government's common-law-escape analogy fails because escapees are not serving their sentences while absconders remain bound — and the government sought new punishment, not mere clock-stopping. Any policy gap left by § 3583(i)'s warrant-or-summons requirement is for Congress.

Implications

Rico resolves a longstanding circuit split in favor of defendants and against a de facto extension-by-abscondment doctrine that several circuits had built. Three practical consequences. First, federal district courts cannot predicate a revocation sentence on post-expiration conduct just because the defendant was 'on the run' when it happened — the revocation must rest on conduct during the judicially ordered term or be covered by § 3583(i)'s warrant-or-summons window. Second, probation offices and U.S. Attorneys will need to be more diligent about obtaining warrants immediately upon discovering absence; a late warrant can no longer be cured by a tolling theory. Third, defense counsel in currently pending revocation cases in the Ninth, Fourth, and similar circuits should file motions to reexamine sentencing calculations that relied on post-expiration conduct. Alito's dissent — that § 3553(a) gives judges ample latitude to account for post-term conduct in downward-variance sentencing — previews how the government and district judges may still consider abscondment-era crimes informally, even if they cannot be independent Grade-A violations. On the textualist-methodological front, the 8-1 lineup (including Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joining Gorsuch) confirms that strict-construction of sentencing statutes has broad cross-ideological support when the stakes are defendant liberty.

Related cases

• Mont v. United States, 587 U.S. 514 (2019) — § 3624(e) true tolling
• United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53 (2000) — refusal to adorn the Sentencing Reform Act
• Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193 (1923) — escape-tolling common-law principle
• Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) — advisory Guidelines, § 3553(a) variance power

Practical guide

For defense counsel: (1) Audit client files for revocation sentences in the Ninth, Fourth, and similar circuits where the court treated post-expiration conduct as an independent supervised-release violation; consider 2255 motions or direct-appeal arguments based on Rico. (2) When a client faces revocation, insist on a warrant/summons issued within the ordered term — push back on later warrants that the government frames as 'still effective' because of tolling. For prosecutors: ensure warrants or summonses under § 3583(i) are issued promptly after discovery of abscondment — do not rely on tolling doctrines. For sentencing judges: when a client committed serious crimes during abscondment but after the term expired, follow Alito's playbook — consider the conduct under § 3553(a) with an explicit variance, avoid treating the crime as a new Grade A violation. For probation offices: tighten procedures for flagging absence and coordinate quickly with USAOs to get warrants inside the term window.

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