Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish

Summary

The Supreme Court vacated a Fifth Circuit decision that had sent a Louisiana parish's state-law environmental suit against Chevron back to state court. Plaquemines Parish and other Louisiana parishes sued dozens of oil companies under the 1978 State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act, targeting, among other things, crude-oil production by Chevron's predecessor during the Second World War. Chevron removed the suit under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. §1442(a)(1), arguing the suit 'relat[es] to' Chevron's wartime duties to refine crude oil into aviation gasoline (avgas) for the military. Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas held that 'relating to' sweeps broadly and that Chevron had plausibly alleged a close — not tenuous, remote, or peripheral — relationship between its challenged crude-oil production and the performance of its federal avgas refining duties. The wartime Petroleum Administration for War identified Chevron's Delta Duck Club field as 'critical' to the war effort, mandated vertical drilling to maximize output, and required steel conservation that pushed refiners toward earthen pits and canals — exactly the activities the parish challenges. Justice Jackson concurred only in the judgment, agreeing Chevron wins but insisting that the 2011 'or relating to' amendment was a 'conforming amendment' that did not displace the traditional causal-nexus test. Justice Alito took no part.

Structured facts

Parties

Petitioner/Appellant: Chevron USA Inc. et al. (WWII-era refiner/producer)
Respondent/Appellee: Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, et al. (joined by the State of Louisiana)

Jurisdiction

federal — U.S. Supreme Court on certiorari from the Fifth Circuit

Statutes cited

28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (federal officer removal statute), Removal Clarification Act of 2011, 125 Stat. 545, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 49:214.21 et seq. (State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act)

Issue

Whether the parish's suit challenging Chevron's wartime crude-oil production is 'for or relating to' Chevron's wartime avgas refining for the military, such that federal officer removal is available.

Holding

Yes. 'Relating to' sweeps broadly and requires only a non-tenuous, non-peripheral connection between challenged conduct and federal duties; Chevron plausibly alleged such a close relationship and therefore satisfied the removal statute.

Outcome

vacated and remanded

Vote

7-1 majority; Jackson concurs in the judgment; Alito took no part

Majority author

Thomas (joined by Roberts, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett); Jackson concurring in judgment

Key facts

• During WWII, Chevron's predecessor (the Texas Company) contracted with the U.S. government to quadruple avgas refining capacity; the Petroleum Administration for War (PAW) oversaw the entire oil industry.
• PAW identified Chevron's Delta Duck Club field in Louisiana as 'critical' to the war program and required production methods (vertical drilling, canals over roads, earthen pits to conserve steel) that maximized wartime crude-oil output.
• In 1978 Louisiana enacted a permitting law for coastal-zone uses, exempting uses 'legally commenced' before 1980.
• In 2013, Plaquemines Parish (joined by others) sued 42 oil companies under the Act, alleging WWII-era uses were illegally commenced and thus unprotected by the grandfathering exemption.
• Chevron removed under § 1442(a)(1); District Court remanded; Fifth Circuit affirmed, reasoning Chevron's avgas contract did not specify how to obtain crude oil.

Reasoning

Drawing on Morales, Ingersoll-Rand, and Ford Motor, Justice Thomas read 'relating to' to reach indirect, non-causal connections — but not so broadly as to be 'meaningless' per Rutledge (Thomas, J., concurring). Chevron's wartime crude-oil production supplied the essential feedstock for its own avgas refining, used PAW-mandated production methods, and occurred in a field the PAW flagged as critical to the war effort. The Fifth Circuit erred by requiring the federal contract to specifically invite the challenged conduct, and by treating the PAW's crude-oil allocation as severing the relation between production and refining (Morales allows relation through intermediaries). Louisiana's alternative theory — that removal requires the defendant to have been 'acting under' a federal officer for the specific challenged acts — was rejected as conflating two distinct statutory elements and rendering 'relating to' redundant.

Implications

The decision is a meaningful win for defendants in the growing wave of state-law climate and environmental suits against energy companies. Cities, counties, and parishes across the country have filed public-nuisance, consumer-protection, and similar claims targeting decades of fossil-fuel conduct; one of the primary battlegrounds has been whether those suits can be forced into federal court under § 1442(a)(1). By reading 'relating to' broadly and rejecting the Fifth Circuit's stricter contract-directive standard, the Court makes federal officer removal more available — at least where defendants can tie challenged conduct to a specific wartime or Cold War federal program. The majority takes pains to say it does not decide the other § 1442 requirements (colorable federal defense, or whether related cases satisfy 'relating to' on their own facts), leaving lower courts room to push back on cases with weaker federal hooks. Justice Jackson's concurrence is a roadmap for those challenges: she argues that the 2011 amendment was a housekeeping change for presuit-discovery proceedings, and that the traditional Willingham causal-nexus test still governs. Expect plaintiffs' bar to adopt Jackson's framing in future remand fights, and expect lower courts to disagree about which test controls. Beyond § 1442, the decision is another data point on the Roberts Court's increasingly textualist reading of 'relating to' — potentially useful in ERISA and ADA-preemption disputes where Morales and Ingersoll-Rand are battlegrounds.

Related cases

• Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., 551 U.S. 142 (2007) — 'acting under' a federal officer
• Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992) — broad 'relating to'
• Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990) — indirect relation
• Rutledge v. Pharmaceutical Care Management Assn., 592 U.S. 80 (2020) — Thomas concurrence on ordinary meaning
• Jefferson County v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423 (1999) — causal-connection test pre-2011 amendment
• District of Columbia v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 89 F.4th 144 (D.C. Cir. 2023) — limits of 'relating to'

Practical guide

For energy-company defendants: if you face state-law claims tied to historical conduct that intersects with federal programs, build your removal record around specific federal directives (war-effort contracts, Defense Production Act orders, AEC licenses, NASA contracts). Document how the challenged conduct flowed from those directives even if no contract clause specifically dictated it. For plaintiffs (municipalities, state AGs, private-attorney-general groups): anticipate broader removal attempts and plead narrowly around conduct that was not part of the federal program — including post-program statements, marketing, or modern operations. Invoke Jackson's concurrence in remand briefing where lower-court judges are open to arguments that 2011 was a non-substantive tweak. For trial judges handling remand motions: the majority's 'close relationship' standard is fact-dependent; develop a record on the specificity and timing of federal directives before ruling. For business lawyers advising on contract structure with federal agencies today, the decision is a reminder that formal silence in a contract does not foreclose 'relating to' protection years later.

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